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HEMORANDUM FOR	;	Chief of Station		
TIRU	:			
FROM	4			
SUBJECT	*	Study Evaluating the Viet	Cong Anti-	

The attached study summarizes known Viet Cong plans and threats to disrupt the 11 September elections and their actual deeds in the immediate pre-election period and on election day.

Because of the overwhelming success of the election, expressed in the huge nation-wide voter participation and the failure of the Viet Cong to disrupt the elections, the answers that this study had initially meant to provide became apparent almost before the polls closed. As a result, despite much probing and analysis of available field reports received in response to specific questions, little has come to light that has not already been said by others.

The extremely efficient and well-coordinated GVN security measures, and the apparent desire of the populace to actively participate in this event unquestionably played a major part in the abysmal failure of the Viet Cong effort. However, other factors contributing to this failure and worthy of mention are discussed in the study.

The large number of manhours expended in this effort have produced a 75-page document, in effect a statistical tabulation of Viet Cong threats and known plans with a listing of reported incidents in furtherance of such plans. Hopefully, this document will serve a useful purpose in predicting events in a future crisis. It may also provide the basis for other studies on VC plans vis-a-vis performance of a long range nature. This tabulation will be completed as late reports are received from the field.

ARMY review(s) completed.

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AN EVALUATION OF THE VIET CONG ANTI-ELECTION EFFORT

Background:

1. This paper is an attempt to summarize the antielection policy of the Viet Cong (VC), its method of
implementation, and its success or failure. At the time of
writing (14 September) information is still being received
on specific plans and incidents that occurred in various
provinces. Consequently this paper should be considered a
preliminary assessment.

Summary:

- 3. The VC failed to accomplish their stated objective of "crushing" the Government of Vietnam (GVN) elections for a Constituent Assembly. They had virtually no success in deterring voters from voting or candidates from campaigning. The result was the most ignominuous political defeat that the VC have ever suffered.
- 4. The reasons for their failure are basically twofold. They overestimated their own influence in GVN controlled areas, and many of their plans were nullified by the highly effective security measures organized by the GVN in the pre-electoral and electoral period. The VC failure, in a sense, reflects a weakness in their district and village level organization, and an inability to accomplish political gains without the use of military force.

Viet Cong Planning:

5. Overall VC plans to disrupt the election appear to have been developed in their main outline by the Regional

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People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) committees after the decision to actively oppose the elections was made by the Central Office for Bouth Vietnam (COSVN). The Provincial Party committees apparently were instrumental only in assigning some tasks to provincial level armed elements and organizing special training courses for Party cadre. The task of drawing up specific plans and targets for harassment and obstruction was left to individual district committees. It was thus mainly the district committees and village chapters of the PRP who were responsible for the implementation of the anti-election campaign.

6. Once the decision had been made to actively oppose the elections the VC embarked on a comprehensive strategy utilizing all the forces under their control. The means included propaganda, demonstrations, terrorism, and plans for large scale attacks. This strategy was evident throughout South Vietnam.

Propaganda Campaign:

7. The VC propaganda campaign, initiated in July, was intensive. I Hundreds of meetings were held in all parts of the country. In those areas where VC propaganda teams were not able to penetrate, whispering campaigns and leaflets were disseminated by VC agents. The propaganda themes were basically the same although some variations were noticed from province to province. Basically the VC told the people that the elections were a fraud perpetrated on the Vietnamese people by the Americans to enable them to expand and intensify the war. Therefore the Viet Cong intended to attack candidates, GVN election cadre and installations prior to and on election day itself. The people were warned to have nothing to do with the elections. If they were forced to vote they should invalidate their ballots. Those who disregarded this warning would be punished severely.

Intimidation and Threats:

8. The VC complemented their propaganda efforts with a systematic attempt to intimidate the population both by threats and by acts of terror. In many cases specific threats

1. See attachments

were made to bomb polling places, attack lines of communications, and assassinate candidates and anyone who voted. Candidates were threatened with death if they did not withdraw from the campaign. Plans were made to confiscate voter's and identification cards from the population. Terrorist teams were activated to attack polling places, GVN installations, and personnel by both fire and assault. In the week before the election VC radio broadcasts tied virtually every incident perpetrated by the VC to their anti-election campaign. This campaign successfully made known to the Vietnamese voter the VC position in regards to the elections, and perhaps backfired against them.

Viet Cong Initiated Incidents:

9. The rate of incidents, as tabulated by MACV, did rise during the last week preceding the election, with a total of 651 incidents of all types being recorded in all parts of the country. One hundred seventy-seven of these came on election day itself. However, it is significant to note that the MACV incident total for the week of 5-11 September 1965 was 637, or only 14 less than the period of most sustained anti-election activity in 1966.

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Incidents vs. Capabilities:

VC threats in most provinces exceeded their capabilities. Whether this was known to the VC before the campaign started or was only later discovered by them, the result has been a merious blow to VC credibility in making good their threats.

Danang:

- 11. The greatest surprise came from I Corps, where the VC were undoubtedly counting on the influence of the remmants of the Buddhist struggle forces to do much of their work for them. Their failure here can be regarded as an overestimation of their capabilities for taking advantage
- 1. Includes all types of incidents, many having no relation to the election.

-4-

of the dissident elements in the area and the unexpectedly efficient GVN security measures.

Nha Trang	and Ban Me Thuot:		
day by the artillery In addition shortly be interest in the short of the shortly be interest in the shortly be interest.	n the reconciliation for a clean contract of the contract of t	able to VC infl poiling operati ied out by GVN/ on between FULR heightened cons	uence on election one and air and
Bien Hoa a	nd Saigon-Gia Dinh	*	
measures a commit the held a prehad the lo of any of This was premore polit	om efficient and we not the unwillingned ir main force units ponderance of force west percentage of the large metropols robably the result ically sophisticate to vote could not be	ell-coordinated ss or inability s even in provi es. The Saigon eligible voter itan areas of S of greater apa ed urban nopula	of the VC to nces where they /Gia Dinh area s casting ballots outh Vietnam. thy among the
My Tho:			
the area w	ed VC armed activit here the VC were mo attack district to heir results still ations.	ty on election of the same of	e good on their
Can Tho:			
a relative.	apability to carry ly high number of i	out their many ncidents the G	C again did not threats. Despite VN was able to

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In addition Hoa Hao influence and active participation generated sufficient interest among themselves and other political groups to assure a large turnout.

Possibility of Future Incidents:

16. To date (14 September) there has been no reported instance of Viet Cong reprisals against either candidates or the population. However, given the magnitude of their defeat, the VC can be expected to make some kind of face-saving gesture in the near future, possibly keyed to the formal convening of the Constituent Assembly on 26 September.

Reasons for Viet Cong Failure:

- 17. It is clear that in the final event, the VC chose not to commit their full military assets to disrupt the elections. There were no instances of VC main force units being committed to anti-election attacks despite several reports ________ that this was planned, especially in the Saigon area. Even in provinces where the VC enjoyed a preponderance of forces (Binh Duong) these forces were not used.
- 18. Based on present evidence it appears that GVN security measures, including ARVN/US sweep and spoiling operations during the final week of the campaign were primarily responsible for blunting whatever plans the VC had for military attacks. These plans were reported time and time again, from all parts of the country, and included the overrunning of district capitals and attacks on security forces. Also any large-scale action on the part of the VC would inevitably involve large losses of military and/or terrorist personnel, given the extensive and efficiently conducted country-wide security measures in effect. It is entirely possible that such losses were considered prohibitive and the PRP decided to abandon many of its plans rather than run the risk of losing trained and difficult-to-replace cadres.
- 19. Another contributing factor which may have influenced VC action was the widespread publicity given the elections and VC plans to disrupt them, the presence of many newspapermen and foreign observers, and the knowledge that the GVN

would attribute a poor turnout of voters to VC terrorism and military pressure. Thus it is likely that the decision was made shortly before election day to confine military attacks to hit and run attacks by fire and rely on the effectiveness of their political apparatus, voter apathy, the expected influence of Buddhist opposition, and their own reputation for making good their threats.

Conclusions:

The negligible influence which the Viet Cong political apparatus (the People's Revelutionary Party - PRP) had on the total vote will undoubtedly result in a serious reappraisal of the PRP's effectiveness at the local level, an area that up to now has been considered the key strongpoint in VC strategy. It should be borne in mind, however, that the elections could only be held in GVN-controlled areas and that some provinces are so completely dominated by the VC (i.e., An Xuyen) that election statistics can be very misleading concerning the actual political realities in the province. Nevertheless, the GVN has demonstrated in a resounding fashion that it has the technical ability and political sophistication to coordinate its various military and security forces in a highly skilled manner to achieve an important political end. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Viet Cong political influence when not supported by armed force, is not the power that it once was and perhaps may have been overestimated.

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NUMBER OF VC ANTI-ELECTION INCIDENTS BY CATEGORY AND REGION (Based on incomplete reporting)

	Canang	Nie Trans	San Me Thuot	H Ho	Can Tho	My Tho	Saigon-Cholon-	Total
*Propaganda	22	26	8	18	11	28	9	122
*Confiscation of ID or voter cards	3		ding	2	4		**	
Kidnappings, Assassin- ations, attacks on GVN candidates, electoral officials and voters	- 5 [1	1.	4	3	7	13	34
Attacks on polling of places or ballot boxes	5	***************************************	2	10	1	10	11	39
Interdiction of LOC's by armed attack or sabotage	2	ç	1	1	2	::3	3	12
Attacks on hamlets, villages, district townships, and pro- vincial capitals	5	2	****	7	7	13	2	35
Attacks on GVN and allied personnel, installations, or outposts	2	4	4	3	1	4	5	23
Total	44	33	16	45	29	69	46	282

^{*} From 1 August through 11 September. All other categories are from 1 through 11 September.

NUMBER OF ANTI-ELECTION INCIDENTS BY CATEGORY AND PROVINCE

(Based on incomplete reporting)

	A	В	<u>c</u>	<u>D</u>	E	F	<u>_G</u>	TOTAL
Danang Region	22	3	5	5	2	5	2	44
Quang Tri	5	GRA	-	146	_	***	-	5
Thua Thien	1	2	***	1	1	***	1	6
Quang Nam	3	-	2	2	1100	3	1	11
Quang Tin	13	-	2	***		•	-	15
Quang Ngai	•	1	2 1	2	1	2	-	7
Ban Me Thuot Region	8	-	1	2	1	•	4	16
Kontum	1	(500)	1	-	•	_	***	2
Pleiku	-	-	460	649		•••	•••	-
Darlac	1	***	-		-	400	-	1
Phu Bon	2	***	•	*-		200		2
Quang Duc	etian	***	-	***	-	-		- Manue
Tugge Duc	4	-	***	***	-	***	4	8
Lan Dong	****	446	***	2	1	-		3
Nha Trang Region	26	***	1	-	-	2	4	33
Binh Ding	2	-	-	•	****	***	2	4
Phu Yen	5	-	-	-		***	1	6
Khanh Hoa	16	***	***	-	•••	1	1	18
Binh Thuan	1	-	-	***	***	1	***	2
Ninh Thuan	2	****	1	-	-	-	**	3

- A Propaganda
- B Confiscation of ID or voter cards
- C Kidnappings, assassinations, attacks on GVN candidates, electoral officials and voters
- D Attacks on polling places or ballot boxes

- E Interdiction of LOC's by armed attack or sabotage
- F Attacks on hamlets, villages, district townships, and provincial capitals

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G - Attacks on GVN and allied personnel, installations, or outposts

	A	В	<u>C</u>	D	E	F	The second secon	TOTAL
Bien Hoa Region	18	2	4	10	1	7	3	45
Phuoc Long	1946	_	***	~	-	ava:	andres,	100
Long Khanh	4	1	-	1	-	5	Service.	11
Binh Tuy	1	•	1	-	***	***	Service	2
Phuoc Tuy	2	-	1	1	***	***	****	4
Bien Hoa	2	1	1	6	•	-	3	1.1
Binh Long	2	-	••	-	1	-		3
Tay Ninh	1	***	****	1	-	Nation.	1	# *** *********************************
Binh Duong	2	-	-	1	440	2	1	g
Hau Nghia	4	cigan.	1	-	-	-	***	iner deny
My Tho Region	28	5	7	10	3	12	4	69
Long An	4	***	3	1	1	-	7.	10
Go Cong	418	***	444		-	3	State .	3
Dinh Tuong	13	5	1	8	1	1.	***	28
Kien Hoa	9	-	***		***	1	1	11
Kien Tuong	ì	-	2	***	***		~	3
Kien Phong	1	-	-	1	-	3	1	6
Vinh Long	549	-	1		1	2		Ą
Vinh Binh	1	øin.	*#*	***	****	2	1	4
Can Tho Region	11	4	3	1	2	7	1	29
Chau Duc	1	1		***	1	2	die	
An Giang	**	***	trus	-	1	-	1	2
Phong Dinh	3	2	3		***	3		11
Ba Xuyen		-	-	****	~	1	***	1,
Kien Giang	2	***	reset .	-	-	***	7800	2
Chuong Thien		1	-	**	-	-	-	1
Bac Lieu	5	-		1	•	-		6
An Ku yen	wells.	-	•	***	***	1	40.7	1
Saigon-Cholon	2	-	7	5	1	1	2	18
Gia Dinh	7	3	6	6	2	1	3	28

A - Propaganda

E - Interdiction of LOC's by

D - Attacks on polling
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B - Confiscation of ID or voter cards

C - Kidnappings, assassinations, attacks on GVN candidates, electoral officials and voters

F - Attacks on hamlets, villages,

district townships, and provincial capitals

G - Attacks on GVN and allied personnel, installations, or outposts

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Province	grandly units in he lied of odd in determine the same determine paid of force as RP or PP feet the More force for and negative soon he under police intolligation soon he made in the light in the light of the manual soon he made in the light of the manual soon he made in the light of the manual soon he made in the light of the manual soon he made in the light of the l	Armed mask in highles! oversity in Night into the land and part go) and part go bring a spirite the forms for the bring of classes. Ve coater which the bring of antique of the part of the land of th	only extend for a first many of the many of the control of the con	Complete in the endergoine and relative costs and sended section of the endergoine section of the endergoine feet the endergoine end	define despite a consistent of a second seco
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HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET*

DIRECTIONS FOR COMPLETING HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET: All hamlets are to be evaluated except those that are considered by the subsector evaluator to be under VC control. It is suggested that a separate Worksheet be used for each evaluated hamlet. During the month, update the evaluation and the problem responses as necessary. At the end of the month review the worksheets. It is recommended that the response selected for each of the 18 indicators be entered in the righthand column. Entries that differ from those made in the preceding month should be transferred to the Hamlet Evaluation Summary Form (HESF) for transmittal to MACV in Saigon. If worksheet entries are made in pencil, the same form can be used repeatedly.

- 1. Identify the hamlet by name and location at the top of the Worksheet. Type of hamlet refers to RD Plan hamlet types: Ap Doi Moi (ADM), Ap Tan Sinh (ATS), Ap Cung Co (ACC), or Ap Binh Dinh (ABD). Use a check mark to indicate whether or not the hamlet is in a National Priority Area (NPA). Enter the best available population figure and indicate by a check mark whether the figure is reliable or unreliable. A reliable figure would fall within 10% of an accurate head count in the opinion of the subsector evaluator. Use a check mark to record that the hamlet has been visited during the month by a US District Team member or other designated US personnel and for by a member of the GVN District staff.
- 2. For each of the 18 indicators, select the response that best represents the hamlet conditions during the month. The brief responses given on the Worksheet are intended to <u>suggest</u> steps in progress from E to A. Refer to Joint MACV-OCO Directive 1-67, 2 Jan 67, Annex E, <u>Guidance for Evaluating HES</u>, for more complete discussion. It should be understood that within each indicator, signs of progress in one rating, "D" for example, are implied in a related "C" rating if not repeated in the description of the "C" rating. The responses refer to the hamlet itself unless otherwise stated.
- 3. Enter in the boxes at the far right the number that represents the confidence you have in the validity of the information upon which your ratings for each factor were based: (1) No confidence; (2) Low confidence; (3) Medium confidence; (4) High confidence; (5) Complete confidence.
 - 4. Changes in the wording of indicators are printed in upper case.

HAMLET PROBLEMS DURING MONTH

Select the \underline{one} best answer for each section of each question

1. Incidents of misconduct by friendly elements adversely affecting friendly relations with the hamlet populace:	
a, US Military. 1. None; 2. Minor only; 3. Serious; 4. Inapplicable; 5. Unknow	٧n
b. Other FWMAF 1. None; 2. Minor only; 3. Serious; 4. Inapplicable; 5. Unknow	۷D
c. ARVN 11. None; 2. Minor only: 3. Serious; 4. Inapplicable; 5. Unknow	vn
d. RF/PF	vn
c. RD Team 1. None; 2. Minor only; 3. Serious; 4. Inapplicable; 5. Unknow	vn
2. Actions by friendly elements during military operations adversely affecting relations with hamlet populace: (including but not limited to fire from any type of weapon, destructive passage withinhamlet area, defoliation)	
1. None;	
2. Minor only.	
3. Serious	
4. Unknown,	
3. Corruption or tyranny of hamlet or village officials:	
1. No indications	
2. Rumored,	
3. Suspected but no proff.	
4. Solid indication.	
5. Unknown. Continued on page	: 3

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* This Worksheet supersedes first edition, 2 Jan 1967 20 May 1967 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000200120004-9

HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET VC Military Activities a. Village Guerrila (G Unit Military control of Vil byceen, most Gs identified 50% leases, havens featroyed, activity below plantlevel, can harass but not prevent GVN activities in hamlet. Vil G control reduced to 1-2 hamlets on Vil perigbery of 2-3 HBS TRAVEL TO HAMLET; route make desperation raid. Activities of Gs from adjacent Vils limited by no havens on by friendly defenses. Vil Ga combat effective the some identified or a VC Vil defenses largely intact. VI) Ge reduced somewhat in men & defenses; can attack in plat strength from within VII or 1-2 MRS TRAVEL TO HAMLET. VIL G remnants triver out. No threat of hara intimidation from Ge in adjacent Vile. EF intect; may have base & can make company-size attacks WITHIN A FEW HRS TRAVEL TO HAMLET. Hemlet or VII may have been fired on and or Unit in district reduced up to 10% in men & arms, o bases near hambet destroyed. No VC operations company size or larger, so mirriar or RR fire near hambet during money. b. External Forces (EF) (Prov. Main Force unit in district) Unit in district eliminated or ineffective; so attacks be plat or larger & no mortar, ROCKET or RR fire in district or mear hamlet. Attack possible only from ourside district. Bases in district CR WITHIN 5 MRS TRAVEL to hamlet destroyed; until in district only marginally effective. Not capable of company-size operations. Armed VC units in hamlet at night, cometimes in as BAVE FIRED ON OR ATTACNED OR OVERRUN M Little or no GVN authority at night. Routes to nam may be interdicted by day; may have been ambush nave homes. o. Military Incidents Affecting Hamlet GVN activity under harasament. MAY BE MINES frequent onlying on routes to hamlet; VC night act hamlet. 3 No incidents including Marasaments in Vil or nearby harnlets or on routes to Vil during month. VC Political & Subversive Activities s. Hamlet Infrastructure Members and most leaders of VC hamlet organize uncovered & neurolized but HAMLET undercover agents will operative. 4 Party cadre underground by day hat free to intin populate at night. No assurance party structure leaders uncovered. Intel indicates must of Party apparetus identifie agents under Vil or Dist contre, still operative. 5 Vil organization wiped out. Yew covert agents dire from outside but stymied by friendly security organizations. c. Activities Affecting Hamlet VC apparatus can undermine OVS in hamlet by inciden ranging from prepagates thru terrorism & sabotage, a least at tizzle. ALC TAXATION MV Vc. 6 No overtorepaganda lut turnurism or annotage of past month. UC TRIXATION PREDOMINANT. No over VC moldents in his to the states of times substrained by SOME CONTILLING OF SIXETEDS Security (Friendly Capabilities a. Martiet Defense Plan a Organization 7 Day & hight defense by external forces in PA SUT DEFENSE FORCE recruiting A triating MAY BI No night before except by external forces although required. PF PRESENT DURING DAY. Defense force organizes BOT ONLY PARTIAL SYRECTION arequire but are remainded to use on CHEAN AREAS ADEQUATE POLICE BY DAY Adequate defense force 4 adequate defense plan following prov RD class WHERE APPLICABLE, IN URBAN AREAS ADEQUATE POLICE DAY AND NIGHT. & FEF ARE INADEQUATE IN STRENGTH to meet nee for arty, air support, reaction grows forces, etc. b. Priendly External Force (PEF) Assista FEF meets needs but only effective marginally, v. g. delayed response, no night response —on aggressive, etc. c. Internal Security A tivities No agenta, no intelligence fyer appradic police informacia No complete intelligence system; a few trained or relatively informatio, seen and inter-remain greenance WHITRE OPERATIVE. Harder third game should be by ... $= \sup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} g_n g_n = g_n e^{-n} , \quad \text{which represents the setting of the setting of$ REFECTIVE INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS COVERS HANLET: number security deputy, police informant system, willing public participation. Administrative & Politics Activities a GVN Governmental Management Complete managerial group faily resident stolades elected surface orders faily faced oring to a view on external value of SECH AR RESTEAM OR 1000 R R 1000 A 100 Res 10 APPOINTED NON-RESIDENT OWN officials, marginellective, IRREGULABLY present, only in cayline. Some local participation in number management, officials usually present but only in captime. EFFECTIVE elected hamlet governing body, ELECT vii COUNCIL, a)) officials in hamlet & V() residen NO CONSIDERATION BY LOCAL OFFICIALS TO POPULAR ASPERATIONS. No rensus activity or grievance program. b. GVN Response to Popular Applications (Consus Gritvance Program) 11 OCCASIONAL RESPONSE BY LUCAL OPPICIAL TO POPULAR ASPIRATIONS. Crisical grievato program MAY MAYE BEEN started in hombs: Same introductional gricinators being the common in SLAN COR CHI. Install remove gelengers a program imported. More GVN settings being taken to meet benefit a gray owners a appropriate IN Hombian tracking Substantial evidence of GVN efforts to meet approxions. RESIDENT GVN grievator representative IN RD HAMLET OR VIL. RESIDENT VILLAGE OFFICIAL associony regular program. Active sublic assarctess of GVN personnel, impacting elections, district programs, etc., civic associations active and effective. 12 Sparement coverage, increased avareness of g arogenite's derivative. In reased numbers of faillets, which marriagely gifted, a sere civil awarded a part of the fail. Prequest arriving even of means of the impact evidents divide the contact of MAY NE STARTING - Health, Education & Welfare a. Medical Services & Public Health 13 NO OR INFREQUENT VISITS TO HAMLET OR VIL BY MEDICAP OR SIMILAR TEAM. Full-state coverage by external torus INAN include ambiguous instruction, INMENIZATIONS, MAY BE MEDIC & MINATE PRESENT IN THE STATE PORTLY THANKO & BRICEPIUS ADEQUATE MEDICAL PROGRAMS, MOSPITAL FACILITIES, SUPPLIES, TRAINED PERSONNEL READILY ACCESSIBLE; GENERAL PUBLIC PARTICIPATION. Only periodic, acheculed costs TO HAMLET OR VIL by MEDCAP or SIMILAR TEAM 14 No UCN eponsores educations: facilities: may be informal instruction by VII vicers, monks, Care mones. Some PARTTIME formal instruction ACCESSIBLE BUT no permanent classrooms OR CLASSROOMS NOT PULLY USED. Perryl, follower public efficient on what program is remarked elapspoore IN (CAMLET OR VIII. htt vergrewded or at every 1 in of AT LEAST MG, INCHILINGEN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL PROJECT IN READILY ACCUSEDS. Programment classification at many service and least Some we'llere activity BY GVN AND OR PORESON SOURCES to all needy families, but usely need to determined. 15 Basic texts being their some very principle from ay GVN. Basic treus satisfies: special benefits clarified & feing sain; benefit channels continue to function. Self Help Activity Civic Action Product from BD OR OTHER THE SACT PROGRAMS ON CIVIC ACTION TO SERVICE local voners & some LOCAL participation in these started. 16 All programmes proposts under day, indeed to satisfy apparational popular participants ago, parado, and Some projects completed; local pride general; continuing external interest and support for new projects. IN SOME CRIAN AREAS NO SUCH PROJECTS NEEDED. 17 b. Public Works (require outside expertise affect at least village SOME TYPE OF PUBLIC WORKS MUCH NEEDED BUT tone planned or underlaws Planted projects suitable 6 metric, λ , rests some work startes. Some detailed planning AT DISTRICT for project moor RD OR OTHER DVN programs. PROJECTS WELL ALONG OR COMPLETED; PUBLIC IS USING NEW FACILITIES, IN SOME URBAN AREAS NO SUCH PROJECTS PRINTING TO STIP ADDRESS THE PROJECTS PROFESS WILL PROVIDE. Zosnomic Improvement Programs (Farming, Flating, Land Reform, New Urban Industries, 10 VN TECHNICAL WORKERS IN THE PARTTIME THAT STORERS INTERPRETED. What programs well advanced in response to popular demant & continuing participation. OR SUCH PROGRAMS NOT NEEDED.

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4. Support of hamlet self-defense force other than	PF by district and/or province officials:
1. Received adequate support as requeste	t.
2. Some support received but inadequate.	
3. Support promised but not received.	
4. Support needed but none promised.	
5. Has self-defense force but outside sup	port not required.
6. Has no self-defense force.	
7. Unknown.	
5. Supplies from outside hamlet or village for self	-help projects:
a. From GVN sources	b. From non-GVN sources
1. On time and adequate.	1. On time and adequate,
2. Delayed but adequate.	2. Delayed but adequate.
3. Inadequate and delayed.	3. Inadequate and delayed.
4. Promised but none received.	4. Promised but none received
5. Promised for future delivery.	5. Promised for future delivery.
6. None required.	6. None required.
7. Unknown	7. Unknown.
6. Access to drinking water:	
a. Local sources of drinking water are inadequ	ate. 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown
b. Plans and/or work underway to improve loc	al drinking water supply 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown
7. Refugee problems:	
a. What percent of the hamlet population are to	mporary residents who are refugees?
1. None or very few	4. More than 50%
2. 10-25 %.	5. 100% (refugee camps only).
3. 25-50%	6. Unknown.
b. Is GVN assistance adequate to enable them	o subsist?
1. None required.	4. Not applicable (refuses only).
2. Required and adequate.	5. Unknown.
3. Required but inadequate.	
8. Tax collection (in kind or in cash):	
a. By the Viet-Cong.	11. Yes]2. No]3. Unknown
b. By the GVN	1, Yes . 2. No 3. Unknown
9. US Advisor's access to hamlet:	The state of the s
a. By surface from district headquarters:	
1. Weapons not necessary.	
2. No special security arrangements nec	essary but weapons must be carried.
3. Special security arrangements necess	ary.
4. Not feasible except by accompanying a	n operation.
5. Access unfeasible.	
6. Unknown.	
b. From airstrip or helicopter pad nearest to	hamlet:
1. Weapons not necessary.	
2. No special security arrangements need	essary but weapons must be carried.
3. Special security arrangements necess	ary.
4. Not feasible except by accompanying	on operation.
5. Access unfeasible	
6. Unknown.	
10. Condition of main routes from hamlet to villag	e center:
1. In good repair, adequate for current	raffic.
2. Being repaired or improved (relocate	d, dredged, new bridge, etc.)
3. Difficult or dangerous to travel becau	se of poor repair.
4. Impassable(flooded, bridge out, stre	am dried up, etc.)
5. Unknown.	

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